Lavell H. Helf v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.: Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Lavell H. Helf v. Industrial Commission of Utah
and Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David M McConkie, Allen L. Hennebold; attorneys for respondents.
Hans M. Scheffler; attorney for petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Helf v. Industrial, No. 940433 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6087
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAVELL H. HELF, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, 
INC. 
Respondents. 
Case No. 940433-CA 
Priority No. 7 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM AN ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DATED JUNE 28, 1994, DENYING THE 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
UTAH COUrtt OF APPEALS 
BftSEF 
UTAH 
C 
r U 
5U 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. °iH0^ 
Hans M. Scheffler (4246) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
311 South State Street # 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David M. McConkie (2154) 
Attorney for Yellow Freight 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Allen L. Hennebold 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
MAR 151995 
•rMiRTOFA.PPHAL% 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAVELL H. HELF, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, 
INC. 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM AN ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DATED JUNE 28, 1994, DENYING THE 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
Hans M. Scheffler (4246) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
311 South State Street # 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David M. McConkie (2154) 
Attorney for Yellow Freight 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Allen L. Hennebold 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Case No. 940433-CA 
Priority No. 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (i) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (i) 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. THE PETITIONER HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY 
LAW 2 
II. THE PETITIONER HAS NOT MISSTATED EVIDENCE 4 
CONCLUSION 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 8 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED Page 
Bevan v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 
1990) 2 
Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 
1994) 1 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63(Utah App. 
1989) 4 
Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1992). 2 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-82.53(2) 1 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-86 1 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16 1 
(i) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
LAVELL H. HELF, ) REPLY BRIEF OP 
THE PETITIONER 
Petitioner, ) 
v. ) Case No. 940433-CA 
Priority No. 7 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ) 
and YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, 
INC. ) 
Respondents. ) 
Comes now the Petitioner, and by and through his 
attorney, now files the following Reply Brief in support of 
his Petition for Review and in response to the Brief filed by 
the Respondents. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §35-1-82.53(2), §35-1-86 and §63-46b-16. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Petitioner has marshaled the evidence 
as required by law? 
2. Whether the Petitioner has misstated the 
evidence? 
All issues involving questions of fact the court 
must apply the substantial evidence Chase v. Industrial 
Commission, 872 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah App. 1994). 
All issues involving questions of law the court 
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must apply the corrections of error standard and give no 
deference to the Industrial Commission. Bevan v. Industrial 
Commission. 790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITIONER HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AS 
REQUIRED BY LAW. 
The Respondent is correct when it argues in its 
Brief that the Petitioner must marshal the evidence in support 
of the Industrial Commission's decision. Johnson v. Board of 
Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992). 
The Petitioner in his Brief at pages 9-10 stated the 
two critical findings of the Industrial Commission were that 
there is no "causal connection between [the Petitioner's] 
injury and his employment" and that the Petitioner's "injury 
did not arise out of and in the course of his employment." R. 
117 
To then satisfy the requirements of marshaling the 
evidence in support of those findings, the Petitioner cites 
the medical records that do prove that the Petitioner did 
suffer from some predisposition to loss of consciousness and 
that he had a prior heart condition diagnosed as idiopathic 
hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. 
The Petitioner then stated in his Brief at page 9 
that the only other evidence which marginally supports the 
Industrial Commission's decision is the fact that at the exact 
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moment he fell, he was walking up the metal loading dock plate 
to lower it into his trailer and that he fell backwards onto 
the loading dock. R. 143, 158 This was confimred by two 
witnesses. 
Lastly, the Industrial Commission found that the 
Petitioner's employment did not enhance the risk of injury. R. 
117 
This last finding is totally unsupported by any 
evidence. Unless this Court is willing to accept the 
Industrial Commission's narrow view that merely walking up a 
mowing metal loading dock plate to force it down into the 
trailer does not enhance the risk of injury. This narrow 
point of view ignores the fact that before walking onto the 
metal loading dock plate, the Petitioner moved some freight 
that was in his trailer. That freight, which was described as 
"awkward and pretty heavy," consisting of stoves, which 
weighed a total of 1279 pounds and fiberglass grating weighing 
200 pounds. R. 79, 81, 82, 167 
The only evidence to support to Industrial 
Commission's finding that the Petitioner employment did not 
enhance the risk of injury is the fact that at the time of his 
fall he was walking up a moving dock plate. That is not 
substantial evidence to support this finding because it 
totally ignores what occurred before the Petitioner's last 
walk. 
As stated above, it ignores the size and weight of 
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the freight he moved prior to the walk, it ignores the fact 
that the Petitioner had to bend over and pull a metal ring to 
cause the metal loading dock plate to pop up so he can then 
use his own weight to force it down into the trailer and it 
ignores the fact that the dock plate was still moving down at 
the time he fell. 
The question then becomes not whether the Petitioner 
has marshaled the evidence but whether the Industrial 
Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
Substantial evidence has been defined as relevant evidence 
that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) 
Based upon the evidence that ttie Industrial 
Commission elected to ignore, it is submitted that its 
findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial 
evidence. It is further submitted that the Petitioner has 
marshaled the evidence in support of the Industrial 
Commission's decision and has demonstrated that decision is, 
at best, only supported by a scintilla of evidence. 
II. THE PETITIONER HAS NOT MISSTATED EVIDENCE. 
The Respondents argue that the Petitioner in his 
Brief misstated the evidence. The alleged misstatement comes 
from the fact that there was no direct evidence about the 
freight the Petitioner moved before pulling the pin and begin 
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his fateful walk up the loading dock plate. R. 79, 81, 82 and 
167 
The Respondent argues that there is no evidence that 
the freight, i.e., the stoves which weighed 1279 pounds and 
the fiber glass grating which weighed 200 pounds, which the 
Petitioner moved did weigh that much. 
The undisputed evidence however is that those stoves 
and fiber glass grating were the only freight in the 
Petitioner's trailer and that the manifest submitted as 
evidence at the time of the hearing showed the weight of the 
freight. Furthermore, the Respondent's counsel stipulated 
that the hearing exhibits A-l and A-2 did accurately reflect 
the freight that was on the Petitioner's trailer at the time 
he was at Gates Rubber. R. 197 It is not a great leap of 
logic to conclude that the items the Petitioner moved were 
very heavy and were very awkward. 
The Respondent argues that a person who weighs 175 
has to use a wall as additional leverage to lower the dock 
plate is "not relevant to any finding" of the Industrial 
Commission. (Respondent's brief, p. 18.) This fact is very 
relevant because it clearly proves that the lowering of the 
dock plate is not as easy a chore as the Respondent would like 
this court to believe. 
It is the Respondent who is attempting to mislead 
this court by only focusing upon the activity the Petitioner 
was involved in at the time he fell off the moving dock plate. 
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The Respondent does not want this court to consider the entire 
circumstance of this tragic incident. The Respondent does not 
want this court to consider the fact that the Petitioner did 
move some very heavy and awkward freight, that he had to bend 
over and pull a metal ring to release the dock plate, that he 
had to immediately walk upon this dock plate to lower it into 
his trailer, that it was difficult to lower the plate and that 
the plate was on an angle and moving at the time the 
Petitioner fell. 
The Respondent's assertion that there is no medical 
evidence to support the Petitioner's claim is just a bold 
faced misrepresentation. The Petitioner has presented 
substantial evidence that his fall and subsequent severe head 
injury were the direct result of his employment. 
Dr. Speed in his November 11, 1992, letter stated: 
"Although the cause of [the Petitioner's] fall 
at work on September [9], 1992, remains 
unknown . . . In the absence of any evidence 
to the contrary, it is therefore my opinion 
that [the Petitioner's] brain injury was work 
relatedc" 
Dr. Null in a June 30, 1993, letter clearly says 
that the stress related to the Petitioner's job, including the 
lowering of the dock plate and the heavy work "culminated in 
a situation of an arrhythmia which resulted in his syncopal 
episode and subsequent head injury." R. 51 
Dr. Freedman in a letter dated November 24, 1992, 
opined that the Petitioner's syncope was probably related to 
his cardiac condition. The doctor further said that if the 
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syncope was indeed on a cardiac basis, "it is likely that it 
was related to whatever level of exertion was present at the 
time." R. 50 
The truth is that Drs. Null, Freedman and Speed all 
opined that the syncopal episode suffered by the Petitioner on 
September 9, 1992, was related to his work. R. 50, 51 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has marshaled the evidence as 
required by law and has conclusively proven that the evidence 
submitted to the Industrial Commission does not support its 
decision. The Petitioner has not misstated any evidence but 
has attempted to focus this court on the entire circumstance 
surrounding this disastrous event. Unlike the Respondents who 
would like this court to put on blinders and not examine all 
the evidence. 
Based upon the foregoing, and the argument outlined 
in his brief, it is submitted that the Petitioner be awarded 
the benefits he claimed in his application for hearing. 
Dated this 15th day of March 1995. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of March 1995 
two copies of the forgoing were delivered to the 
following: 
David Mo McConkie 
Attorney for Employer 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this 15th day of March 1995. 
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